Search results

The First Amendment affords protection to political speech on the basis of its high value. However, political speakers who make inflammatory statements on both sides of an issue do not advance political projects. An entity that purchases inflammatory social media advertising, for instance, both for and against gun control, and generates offsetting reactions simply raises the level of discursive conflict. This actor may be identified as a bad faith political speaker through relatively objective criteria. One-sided content producers, by contrast, even if they utter falsehoods and inflame discourse, cannot be so easily branded. The Gertz court, and First Amendment doctrine in general, correctly views this challenge as better handled outside of the courtroom. The novelty presented here is that evidence of two-sided content production can curtail the need for discretion and potentially close the door to many errors in judgment. Classifying two-sided inflammatory speech as low value is relatively easy to administer judicially, consistent with economic efficiency, and increases the political bargaining space by reducing discursive conflict. It also has the advantage of prohibiting egregious outside interference in an election without the need to identify the geographic origin of the disruption.

This issue of Research in Law and Economics covers several areas of important research by a variety of international scholars. It contains theoretical papers on privacy, the protection of personal data, the use of regulatory monitoring under legal standards vs. rules, a study of the properties of market efficiency in securities fraud litigation, as well as an analysis of nonexclusionary price floors. It also contains an empirical paper on the relationship between uncertainty of patent approval of artificial intelligence applications and the Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. Finally, Volume 30 contains a law-and-economics assessment of the Chinese financial system within the context of the trade-off between centralized control and rapid growth.

While many believe that nonperforming loans (NPLs), privatization of banks, informal lending, and other forms of shadow-banking, as well as technological advances in machine learning for assessing creditworthiness will place China's financial regulatory system on a trajectory toward openness and privatization, other trajectories are possible and likely. Consider that each disturbance can be met with controlled alternatives. For NPLs, there are asset management companies; for informal lending, there is new technology to lower transaction costs and increase formalization and consolidation; for systemic risk presented by other forms of shadow-banking, there is systemic isolation of the traditional banking sector which substantially lowers that risk; and while machine learning promises more accurate assessments of creditworthiness for millions of individuals and small- to medium-sized enterprises, it promises far less improvement to assessments of China's 3,500 large enterprises that present substantially different variables. Privatization and openness is not necessary for China's continued development for a time just as liberalized payment regimes and foreign direct investment rules do not imply the implementation of broad, liberal capital controls. Financial regulators in China, therefore, will continue to implement policies of limited and piecemeal openness so long as the benefits of control continue to exceed those of faster-paced development.

This issue of Research in Law and Economics covers several areas of important research by a variety of international scholars. It contains technical papers on the appropriate way to estimate damages in patent disputes, as well as methods for evaluating relevant markets and vertically integrated firms when determining the competitive effects of mergers and other actions. There are also papers on the implication of different legal processes, regulations, and liability rules on consumer welfare, which range from the impact of delays in legal decisions in labor cases in France to issues of criminal liability related to the use of artificial intelligence.

We propose a simple model consisting of two separated markets: the market for good y and the market for good x. Purchasing information about consumer behavior in the former market helps the monopolist firm, in the latter market, to price-discriminate. Consumers differ in their income and in their level of myopia. Personal data market regulation could both increase consumers' awareness about the treatment of their data and allow them to have their data erased from the data holder. We find that the former aspect of the policy reduces the number of transactions, and hence tends to reduce total surplus, while the second typically boosts willingness to pay of consumers and has positive effects on surplus, provided that the share of high-income consumers is not too high. The overall effect of regulation on total welfare depends on the share of high-income and myopic consumers.